Quine's characterization of PS in [il] ist "given a true statement of identity, one of its two terms may be substituted for the other in any true statement and the result will be true" ( [il] , 139). This statement is in a certain respect ambiguous. Before pointing out its ambiguity, some symbolism will be introduced for the sake of providing precise formulation.of PS. What this quotation indicates is that Quine'8 statement that "given a true statement of identity* one of its two terms may be substituted for the other in any true statement and the result will be true," is a characterization of the conditions under whlcfr a singular term is (to use Quine's phrase) subject to PS.
PS is manifestly about substituting one singular terra for another co-referential singular term in sentences of a certain specified classi for the requisite substitution must be made in some sentence(s) or other, and these "some sentence(s) or other" constitute the specified class. Let S be the specified class of sentences. To say. as Quine does, that a singular term t is subject to PS in a given sentence is just to say that, where t and t' are co-referential singular terms, t' may be substituted for t at one or more of t*s occurrences in any member s of S and the resulting sentence will have the same truth value as 8. But "f may be substituted for t M means the same as "t may be replaced with t'." Moreover, to say that a singular term t is partially replaceable salva veritate in a given sentence is just to say that, where t and t* are co-referential singular terms, t may be replaced with t* at one or more of t's occurrences in any member s of S and the resulting sentence will have the same truth value as s. Therefore, to say, as Quine does, that a singular term t is subject to PS in a given sentence s is just to say that t is partially replaceable salva veritate in s.
'...is partially replaceable salva veritate in...' is to be preferred to '...is subject to PS in...' simply in order to avoid equivocating on 'the principle of substitutiv! ty' , for this phrase denotes the entire formulation of PS, whereas adoption of the second-mentioned predicate requires using 'the principle of substitutivity' also to denote a proper part of the entire formulation of PS, viz•. the conditions specified therein.
Let 'R' be introduced to mean '...is partially replaceable Sfilva veritate in... The 'law', however, it seems, is just false, for it is possible that Smith knows that Venus is the morning star and yet does not know that Venus is the evening star, though 'The morning star is the evening star* is a 'true statement of identity'. Again, from
. Then PS, as characterized by Quine in LÜJ» might be formulated as follows t (u) (s) ( R(u,s) «r-> ((3t1
(1) Ci cero is Tully and (2) 'Cicero' is spelled with six letters it does not follow that (3) 'Tully* is spelled with six letters.
Linsky uses each of these examples to show that PS is "just false." Linsky goes on to argue that PS is such that "no two terms obey it"t
Not only is it possible to produce counterexamples to Leibniz's law, it can be shown that no two terms obey it. Let t and jj* be different terms and consider any true statement of the form (4) Jones explicitly denied that t « t*. Surely one cannot substitute t for i* in (4) in. order validly to obtain (5) Jones explicitly denied that t = t. No statement of the form (5) follows from the corresponding statement of the form (M, even though t = t be true.
([I], 100-101)
Any of these examples clearly does show that PS-1 is false. Moreover, PS-1 will be such that no two terms obey it, for, given PS-1, obeying PS would require that a singular term be partially replaceable salva verltate with any co-referential singular term in any sentencei and Linsky's examples are clearly examples of failure of such replaceability. From Linsky's second argument it follows that no. singular term is partially replaceable salva verltate in a.ny, sentence, where such replaceability is analyzed as by PS-2. Hence, PS-2 will be such that no two terms obey it. But in this case PS-2 will be true, for each of its instantiations will be a bi-conditional each side of which is false* It follows that Linsky's conclusion that PS is "just false" is appropriate only for PS-1, although Linsky's conclusion that PS 1B such that "no two terms obey it" is appropriate for both PS-1 and PS-2. It also follows that if 'R' is to be true of any singular term-sentence pairs, an alternative formulation of PS must be provided. What remains to be considered is whether PS-3 provides an adequate analysis of PS. PS-3 provides an adequate analysis of PS just in case PS-3 provides an adequate analysis of *R', for the whole point of PS is Just to provide an analysis of 'R'. Necessary and sufficient conditions of adequacy of an analysis of 'R' are (a) that 'R' be analyzed so as to be true of some singular termsentence pairs and (b) that the suggested analysis incorporate the essential features of partial replaceability salva veritate of co-referential singular terms in sentences.
Where u is a singular term, the essential features of u's being partially replaceable salva veritate in a sentence a are (i) that u occurs in 8 and (il) that any sentence which results from replacing u with a coreferential singular term has the same truth value as s. PS-3 does provide an adequate analysis of 'R'. That clause (i) is satisfied is accounted for by the requirement that
